Approved For Release 2001/03/04; CIA-RDP80S01499R000100040032-1

Attachment USIB-D-21.1/4 28 February 1963

25X1X7

25X1X7 _{Comments on}	Comments on
Estimate of the Commu	nist Chinese Air Threat
Against India", 17 January 1963	
25X1X7 25X	1X7
1. comments on the	Estimate of the Communist
Chinese Air Threat to India" have been car	refully studied and we have
thoroughly rechecked our information on the	ne points raised. In nearly all
cases we find our data supports the position	ns taken in the original paper.
25X1X7	05/4/7
In some cases the apparent diffe	
estimate and the position results ma	ainly from the use of different
assumptions or methodologies rather than	
(a) In estimating aircraft strength which co	
no stockpiling. If the stockpiling.concept is accepted, we agree that 60 IL-28s	
and 108 MIG-15/17s could be accommodated, except we believe four months	
stockpiling would equate only to about 42 d	
(b) Our estimate of lower logistic capability	
accepted methodology in which road capacities, terrain, and weather are	
considered. In the case of Tibet it is these	factors rather than truck availability
which sets the limits. (c)	II are designations of the two
runways on the field we call "Lhasa". 25X	1X7
_	25X1X7
3. We can give no credence to the	estimate of 45 TU-16
(BADGERs) of which 32 are estimated depl	ovable against the Indians. We

3. We can give no credence to the estimate of 45 TU-16 (BADGERs) of which 32 are estimated deployable against the Indians. We have re-examined our evidence, which we believe to be solid, and reaffirm with a high degree of confidence our original estimate of two such aircraft.

4. We continue to believe that our estimates of aircraft capabilities and high altitude limitations are valid. We do not believe that experience with transports provides valid data on which to judge military jet high elevation landing and take-off performance and we believe that low pressure tires are not adaptable to jet-fighter wheel wells. We have no evidence comparable to that cite regarding Chinese radar capabilities in the Himalayas and stand by our previous estimate.

5. We are still checking all available data to see if we can find confirmation for the additional airfields listed by the 25X1X7

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